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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this work is to demonstrate through
a specific case study how profoundly foreign policy is
directed by domestic considerations— considerations
which ultimately rely upon our perceptions of ourselves
and others“-perceptions that are subject to manipulation,
coercion, and distortion.
It is the thesis of this work that American China
policy and American understanding of Sino-Soviet rela
tions between 19^5 and 1972 were the outgrowth of domestic
affairs and were founded upon gross misperception.
This
misperception began within ourselves and was fed,
reinforced, and perpetuated at level after level of the
policymaking process.
Chapter I deals with American China.policy between
19^5 and 1972.
Chapter II concentrates upon domestic
political and intellectual influences which provided
the ambience for misperception in the formulation of
China policy. Attention is given to the disruptive
effects of the China bloc, the China Lobby, Jpseph
McCarthy, and the Committee of One Million.
Chapter
III presents a survey of the perception of the SinoSoviet split, 1956-1972, on the part of American
academicians, journalists, and policymakers.
The results suggest that the irrational fear of
Communism created by the various China lobbyists and
Senator McCarthy molded China policy into a rigid
orthodoxy, drove Asia scholars into conservatism, and
distorted perception of the Sino-Soviet split on the
part of American academicians and policymakers.

THE MYTHICAL MONOLITH:
AMERICAN CHINA POLICY
AND THE
SINO-SOVIET SPLIT, 194-5-1972
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INTRODUCTION

From our first smack on the buttocks to our final
gasp for air we all respond to the world around us.
we stop responding we are dead, or may as well be.

When
Our

response is not always to objective reality, however, but
1
to a perception of it.
In other words, men frequently
respond to fictions they themselves have created.

This is

true of relationships between individuals, and unfortunately,
it is carried into relationships between nations, as well.
Thus, international relations are often a matter of
faulty perception rather than of objective reality.

To

say that there are no objective problems in international
affairs would be folly, of course.

But world politics

lends itself all too readily to the development of wide
gaps between what reality is and the way it is perceived.
Because of this, perception probably plays as important
a role in international relations as does reality itself.

2

Perception is the essence of this work--perception of
China and the Sino-Soviet conflict as it unfolded.
Chapter I will deal with American China policy
between 19^5 and 1972, which was, unfortunately, founded
upon a large measure of myth and misperception.

Chapter II

will concentrate upon domestic political and intellectual
influences which provided the ambience for such misper-

3
ception, e.g. the China bloc, McCarthyism, the China
Lobby, and the Committee of One Million.

The ideological

orthodoxy imposed upon American foreign policy through these
influences strongly affected the subsequent blindness of many
American professionals to the Sino-Soviet split, which is
the subject of Chapter III.
of professional academicians,

A survey will be conducted
journalists, and policymakers,

and an attempt will be made to divide their opinions into
schools of thought and to discern which type of professional
best perceived the realities of the situation.

These

professional groups have been selected for study because
they offer informed opinion that has been assumed, tradi
tionally, to have some input in the foreign policymaking
3
process.
Chapter IV will present conclusions drawn from
the information presented in Chapters I through III.
It is not my purpose to provide a definitive analysis
of American China policy since World War II, the domestic
atmosphere that helped create it, or the subsequent
misperception of Sino-Soviet relations on the part of
American professionals.

My purpose is, rather, to

demonstrate through a specific case.study how profoundly
foreign policy is directed by domestic considerations-considerations which ultimately rely upon'our perceptions of
ourselves and others--perceptions that are subject to
manipulation,

coercion, and distortion.

It is the thesis of this work that American China
policy and American understanding of Sino-Soviet relations

between 19^5 and 1972 were the outgrowth of domestic
affairs and were founded upon gross misperception.

This

misperception began within ourselves and was fed, reinforced,
and perpetuated at level after level of the policymaking
process.

It is hoped that similar mistakes can be prevented;

but prevention cannot come about without change, and change
is never instigated until a need for it is realized.
study, then, illustrates the workings of a mistake.

This
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NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

1

I acknowledge that there are those who would argue
that no reality exists outside one1s perception, hut
for the purpose of this paper, we will assume that it
does.
2
.
John Stoessinger, Nations m Darkness:
China,
Russia, and America (New York:
Random House, 1971)» P3
The occupations of those professionals whose works
will he discussed in Chapter III are crucial to the •
conclusions drawn in this work.
Biographical data appear
in later footnotes, hut to avoid redundancy this informa
tion will not he provided every time reference is made to
an author.
It is suggested that the reader refer to the
chart on page 73 if he is interested in this information
at other points in his reading.
In some cases, occupa
tional categorization is not beyond dispute, hut I con
sider my classifications justifiable. Also, not all pro
fessionals represented in this work are Americans.
Since
non-Americans who are known, published, and read in the
United States unquestionably contributed to and became a
part of American perception of the Sino-Soviet split, they
are rightly included here.

CHAPTER I
CHINA, 1945-1972:

MYTH, MISPERCEPTION, AND MISSED
OPPORTUNITIES

Long ago, in America's distant past, domestic
affairs and foreign affairs existed as more separate
entities than they do today.

Domestic politics con

stituted one sphere, and foreign relations another, for
the most part.

This was never a hard and fast rule, of

course, hut the problems of one area overlapped,

crisscrossed,

or otherwise intruded into the other only infrequently.
It was, indeed, a less complex era; and it has passed.
This chapter attempts to demonstrate that American China
policy between 19^5 and 1972 was part of a very different
era.

It was primarily an outgrowth of domestic politics,

shaped by myth, misperception, and missed opportunities.
Postwar changes in the foreign policymaking process contrib
uted to the difficulty of sound policymaking, and various
elements combined to make what has been dubbed, quite
1
aptly, the "China myth."
The oldest element of this myth was the belief that
a vast market for American goods could be developed in
China, and that China, therefore, was essential to American
well-being.

"China market" rhetoric flourished in such

abundance that the distinction between the potential and

6

the reality was often lost, and many Americans came to
cherish a "market" that never actually existed..

After

the Chinese Revolution of 1 9 H » Americans inaccurately
viewed China as a developing democracy; and with Chiang
Kai-shek's rise to power, we convinced ourselves that under
his astute leadership, China would become Christian.
(Chiang professed to be Methodist.)

The dogma that

Communism was monolithic, with all Communists working
in concert to overthrow the world, was another element
of the myth.

This led to American misperception of

Chinese Communism as an extension of the Soviet brand,
while it actually represented an indigenous Chinese
movement.

Native Communism in China was something that

we could not accept, however.

It did not fit into our

self-delusive perception of China as an oriental extension
s

of ourselves--an importer and consumer of American goods,
a democracy, and a Christian democracy at that.
Thus, various American political groups, together with
the Chinese Nationalists, had a fertile field for the biggest
myth of all— the myth that somehow the United States had
"lost" China through the Communist victory of 19^9*

As

China never belonged to us, it is difficult to.see how we
could have "lost" it, but nevertheless the myth grew,
fired by a neurotic fear of Communism that-was fed by
lobbying organizations and ambitious politicians.
Included among them were the China bloc, the China
Lobby, the Committee of One Million, and Senator Joseph
McCarthy of Wisconsin.

American policymakers, sinking

8
in a mire of delusion, took the bombastic rhetoric of
China's new leaders at face value and based policy upon
the myth that Communist China was a dangerously expansion
ist power.

Ostrich-like, we began to claim that the

People's Republic would expire, and we proceeded to
formulate China policy upon that premise.

American

leaders, with vision clouded by myth and misperception,
missed opportunities for more pragmatic Sino-American
relations.

(Moderate elements in China had been interested

in improving relations with the United States as late as
June 19^9• )
The various China lobbyists wielded considerable
clout in Washington in the late forties and early fifties
and developed to perfection the art of manipulating
public opinion.

The Truman Administration,

consciously

concentrating upon Europe first, left itself vulnerable
to the charges of neglect toward Asia and the "loss" of
China.

The myriad of myths, misperceptions, and missed

opportunities that were outgrowths of this domestic
political environment contributed to American China policy
between 19^5 and 1972.

Such were the elements of foreign

policymaking in a government that had long outgrown the
simple days of separation between domestic and foreign
affairs.

These elements are graphically illustrated in

the discussion of American China policy that follows.

During the Second World War, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt maintained a strong commitment to China's being

9
one of the "big four" powers, which, along with the Soviet
Union, would guarantee postwar peace.

The goal, was "a

united, democratically progressive, and cooperative China
which will be capable of contributing to security and
prosperity m

the Far East."

2

Washington urged the

coalition of Nationalist and Communist forces in the hope
that the Communists could eventually be absorbed into a
unified Chinese government.

Mutual mistakes compounded

with mistrust destroyed any hope of postwar SovietAmerican cooperation, and events were to prove that
Roosevelt’s dreams for China were also founded upon
illusion.
The American Ambassador to China during the war,
Major General Patrick J. Hurley, believed that if the
Chinese Communists were cut off from American support
s.

they would buckle under and come to terms with a coalition
government.

Neither Hurley’s staff at the Embassy nor

the foreign service officers serving as political advisors
to the military command accepted his estimate of Chinese
conditions.

There was agreement that policy should be

directed toward coalition, but the career diplomats were
convinced that the intransigence of the Kuomintang (the
Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek) was the main
obstacle to Chinese unity.

Many officers believed that

Hurley grossly underestimated the determination of the
Chinese Communists.

They felt that in the absence of aid

from the United States, the Communists would be forced to
turn to the Soviet Union for assistance, creating problems

10
between America and Russia over China.

3

In January 19^5* more than four years before they
achieved national power in China, Mao Tse-tung and Chou
En-lai, the leaders of the Communist forces, offered to
come to Washington to talk with Roosevelt in an effort
to establish a working relationship with America.

Their

message was not forwarded, except as a secondary reference
in another context, either to the State Department, the
War Department,

or the President.

Chungking by Ambassador Hurley.

It was held up in
Consequently, the United

States never responded to the overture.
An obvious question is whether the Chinese Communists
were flexible enough ideologically in 19^5 to desire
seriously an association with America.

Barbara Tuchman,

long-recognized as an astute observer of China, feels that
they were.

According to Tuchman, the Communists were,

above all else, pragmatic.

They wanted to convince the

President that they, not the Nationalists, represented
the future in China; they wanted recognition as a major
party, not as an outlaw; they wanted to acquire belligerent
status as a party to the coming Allied victory; they had
in mind that an American connection would help them meet
the day when the Soviets would enter Manchuria; and John
Stewart Service, a career foreign service officer, was
convinced that the Chinese Communists hoped to avoid an
exclusive dependence upon the Soviet Union.^

As late

as 19^7* 0. Edmund Clubb, the U.S. consul general in
Peking, reported that the Communists preferred American
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to Soviet aid:

'"A future tied to the Soviet Union alone

offers them nothing hut bleak prospects in terms of
obtaining needed industrial and consumption goods.

. . .

The large stock of inspiration they get from Moscow will
do little toward restoring China's shattered industry and
prostrate finances.*”^
There are those who feel that American non-response
to the 19^5 overture represented one among many missed
opportunities for more pragmatic Sino-American relations.
I, however, differ with this interpretation.

United

States Presidents do not meet with the leaders of every
guerrilla group that threatens the security of a foreign
nation's established government.

Although Hurley cannot

be excused for not forwarding the Communists' request to
Washington, it is unrealistic to assume that Roosevelt
would have or should have taken it seriously.

The situation

had changed, however, by 19^9* Uut American policy remained
locked intractably in established patterns that had lost
their viability.
If the Communists, nonetheless, retained hopes for
American support, a statement by Hurley on April 2, 19^5
severely dampened those hopes.

He announced that the

American government would support only the Kuomintang
regime and would not recognize or supply any other forces.
When officers of his embassy reported accommodation to be
less likely than he believed, Hurley charged that they
were anti-Nationalist and were thus subverting American

7
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policy.

Because of his complaints, most of the foreign

service officers who understood the Chinese Communists were
transferred to positions outside China.

A tragic side

effect of these transfers was the early misperception on
the part of American observers that Chinese Communism
was an extension of Soviet Communism, which it indeed was
not.

It was, rather, an indigenous expression of uniquely

Chinese social problems.

In fact, Sino-Soviet relations

during this period were noticeably mundane, according
to the reports of one diplomat, John F. Melby:
My primary job was to keep track of what
the Russians were up to in China.
The
assignment was socially pleasant since
the Soviet Ambassador was an educated,
charming, and shy man whom I had known
rather well in Moscow, and several m e m - •
bers of his staff were equally congenial.
But it was professionally rather nominal
since it developed that they really were
not up to much of anything beyond the
g
usual diplomatic routine and formalities.
Of course, it would have been possible for the Soviets
to direct activities outside of the normal diplomatic
channels, but if they did, such activities went unnoticed
and unrecorded by such astute observers of Sino-Soviet
Q
affairs as 0. Edmund Clubb.
The difficulties inherent in bringing about NationalistCommunist accommodation eventually became apparent to
Hurley, who resigned suddenly in November 19^5«

He was

unwilling, however, to accept any personal blame for his
failure, and he left China making accusations that antiNationalists in the State Department and the China mission
were subverting American policy.

Although Hurley's
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resignation was of minor importance when it occurred, it
was to take- on ominous significance during the ignominious
McCarthy era.
After Hurley resigned, General George C. Marshall
was sent to China to accomplish Nationalist-Communist
union through a mutually acceptable constitutional
system.

He secured a truce for a short time, but the

arrangement collapsed and fighting resumed.

He finally

dispaired of his tenure in China, which lasted from
December 19^5 until January 19^7* and returned to the United
States to become Secretary of State.

Marshall blamed his

failure less on the Communists than on the Nationalists;
Chiang's intractability proved a constant stumbling
block.

But despite these difficulties, a high-level

consensus emerged that America should back non-Communists
10
in China against the Communist opponents.
Marshall supported a non-Communist solution to problems
in China, but because of his 19^5-19^7 experience, he had
doubts as to whether the United States should support the
Nationalists.

Marshall's replacement in the China post,

John Leighton Stuart, also acknowledged the defects of
the Nationalists'regime, but he had a strong affection
for Chiang and believed that the United States should
guarantee his survival.

Like so many others, Stuart

believed that the Gommunists were authoritarian dupes of
Moscow, and that sufficient American aid to the Nationalists
11
could secure the latter's success.
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Discussion of American China policy in the late
1940*s cannot take place as if it existed in a vacuum.
Policy vis-a-vis one nation evolves concurrently with
domestic politics and a global ambience, and in 1947*
the Truman Administration was occupied with issues that
outweighed the China problem.

In March, the Truman

Doctrine requesting immediate aid to Greece and Turkey
was announced, and the Marshall Plan followed in June.
Implicit in both was the overriding importance of Europe
to American security and economic well-being, with Asia
being of lesser significance.

China policy was being

reconsidered by the Administration during this period,
but in a context of secondary importance.
In June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that
the United States reverse its policy of official non
interference in the Chinese civil w a r . ^

As part of this

reappraisal of China policy, and in an effort to placate
domestic elements that wanted increased aid to Chiang,
Marshall sent General Arthur Wedemeyer to China to evaluate
the situation.

Accompanied by a small staff, Wedemeyer

toured China for a month, visiting the Nationalist
capital, Formosa, Canton, Shanghai, and areas in the north
and northeast.

He delivered his report of the mission

to Marshall and the President on September 19» 1947.
Wedemeyer recommended considerable military and economic
aid, contingent upon Chiang's agreement to carry out
sweeping reforms.

He also suggested that United Nations
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action be taken in Manchuria to relieve Chiang of the
13
responsibility of maintaining that area.
Truman and Marshall did not consider East Asia
sufficiently important to American security to warrant
such measures.

They were convinced that security dollars

would provide infinitely greater returns when invested
in Europe.

This was not publicly disclosed, however, and

the Administration decided to suppress the Wedemeyer
report, leaving itself susceptible to charges of deceit
that eventually followed.
Truman and his advisors realized their vulnerability
on the China issue; they took a calculated political risk
and allowed the public to remain in the dark on China.
A full-scale educational campaign explaining the primary
role of Europe to American security could have been
s

launched, but the Administration realized that the Repub
licans could have turned the former’s own argument
against them, asking why the same logic would not apply
to Asia.

If a non-Communist Europe was essential to

American security, was not a non-Communist Asia just as
important?

This was one political gamble whose conse

quences reverbated throughout the next quarter century,
and it serves to illustrate that domestic politics and
foreign affairs were not,separate entities in the forties,
but were entwined intricately; thus they remain today.
The decision against intervention in China was con
veyed to Congress in February 19^8, but pro-Chiang pressure
continued from some in the diplomatic and military missions,
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the military establishment in Washington, the China bloc,
and the China Lobby.
Perhaps definitions of the China bloc and the China
Lobby would be helpful at this point.

The China bloc

was not a formally organized group; it was, rather, an
amorphous body of congressmen, the numbers of which changed
from time to time.

What did not change was that they

consistently demanded greater support for the Nationalists.
With the exceptions of Pat McCarran of Nevada and James
Eastland of Mississippi, who were Democrats, these congress14’
men were very conservative Republicans.
Pro-Chiang
senators, in addition to Eastland and McCarran,

included

Owen Brewster (Republican, Maine), Styles Bridges (Repub
lican, New Hampshire), Harry Cain (Republican, New Jersey),
Homer Ferguson (Republican, Michigan), Joseph McCarthy
(Republican, Wisconsin), and Alexander Smith (Republican,
New Jersey).

Pro-Nationalist members of the House of

Representatives were 0. K. Armstrong (Republican, Missouri),
Walter Judd (Republican, Minnesota), Joseph Martin, Jr.
(Republican, Massachusetts), Lawrence Smith (Republican,
Wisconsin), and John Vorys (Republican, Ohio).

15

This

group was almost pathologically alarmed by what they saw
as a monolithic conspiratorial force, directed by the
Soviet Union, with the aim of suppressing liberty every
where, overthrowing, free enterprise, and "burying” the
United States.

16

The China Lobby, which should not be confused with
the congressional China bloc, consisted of an inner core

*7
of well-financed Nationalist Chinese officials and
supportive right-wing Americans.

It worked through many

variegated organizations and publications.

Among them

were the Universal Trading Corporation, the Chinese Oil
Corporation,

Commerce International Corporation,

the American Technical and Military Advisory Group to the
Chinese Government, the American China Policy Association,
the China Emergency Committee, the Committee to Defend America
by Aiding Anti-Communist China, the Committee for Consti
tutional Government, "America's Future, Inc.," The China
Monthly, and Plain Talk.

These groups were formulated

specifically as branches of the China Lobby, but several
long-standing American publications supported the National
ist Chinese and their views.

Among them were Collier*s ,

the Saturday Evening P ost, Human Events, American Mercury,
Reader's Digest. U.S. News & World Report, The New Leader,
and L i f e .

Outstanding among pro-Chiang newspapers were

the New York Journal-American, the Washington Times-Herald,
the Examiner (both Los Angeles and San Francisco), the
Oakland Tribune, and the Manchester, New Hampshire, Union
17
Leader.

Both the China bloc and the China Lobby will be

discussed at greater length in Chapter II.
During the debates over the Marshall Plan, China
lobbyists attempted to add aid to Chiang to the appropri
ations for the European Recovery Program.

What emerged

was a compromise--the China Aid Act of April 1948--which
was tacked onto the Foreign Assistance Act.

It provided for

$338,000,000 in direct economic aid and $ 125*000,000 in

military assistance for one year.

This, in reality was merely

a sop to the China lobbyists, as the Truman Administration
had already decided that the internal conditions in China
were such that large-scale intervention would be imprudent.
As Senator Yandenberg later said, the China Aid Act amounted
to no more than "three cheers for Chiang Kai-shek."

The aid

did not reach Chiang in time, and whether it would have done
any good if it had is questionable.

In October 19^9* ihe Com

munists proclaimed the People's Republic of China, and in De11
cember, Chiang and what was left of his forces fled to Formosa. '
Although debate raged for a decade about what should have
been done, real debate about whether to intervene militarily
in China stretched only over the year from Spring 1947 to
Winter 1947-48.

American options during this period were

to try to save Chiang by exorbitant military aid and advice,
or to bend to China's indigenous realities.

The second

option was followed, and as" Dean Acheson explained in his
introduction to the China White Paper, "the unfortunate but
inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war
in China was beyond the control of the government of the United
States

. . . .

It was the product of internal Chinese forces."

It is an irony of history that the Truman Administra
tion considered an explanation of the difference between
areas of vital concern to the United States and areas of
peripheral concern too subtle for the understanding of the
American public.

As has been mentioned, such an explana

tion could have been attacked by political opponents, but
left unexplained by the Administration, the issue was to

19

•
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become potent ammunition in the argument of China lobbyists
for the "loss" of China through internal betrayal.
There are those who feel that before the Korean War
the Truman Administration was consciously withholding
recognition and attempting to isolate the new Communist
regime only as a tactic to force the Chinese to live up
to its definition of proper international obligations.

If

those obligations had been met, the Administration would
probably have extended recognition, as it wanted to
encourage Titoism in China and to promote a rift in SinoSoviet relations.

20

Whether the Administration considered

recognition to be a viable policy option is questionable,
but it was certainly discussed--a fact that was repeatedly
denied during the McCarthy witch hunts when it meant
professional suicide to admit that one's understanding
of international relations went beyond the orthodoxy of
. 21
paranoia.
Moderate elements in China showed interest in American
22
recognition as late as June 19^9»
but after that time,
the United States had missed its chance with the People's
Republic.

From then on, the more radical anti-American

forces in China had gained the upper hand, and the Chinese
Communists
were the badge of Communist orthodoxy and
were openly committed to a pro-Soviet
policy.
The United States, by siding
with the Nationalists in the civil war,
had helped to -solidify the Communists
in that position . . . .
In his speech
of July 1, 19^9 i Mao Tse-tung had re
vealed the key to his strategy.
China,

20
he said, could not look to imperialist
powers for help; only the revolutionary
Soviet Union would be prepared to provide
the assistance that would make China's
sinews strong.
Consequently, China would
lean to the side of the Soviet Union.
On January 5, 1950, Truman announced a policy of
non-support for the Nationalists in the Chinese civil
strife, and Acheson added that this was proof to the world
that America would not meddle in internal Chinese affairs.
With Chinese Communist entrance into the Korean War in
November, however, Truman reversed this nascent policy.
The United States became solidified in opposition to
the Chinese Communists and in containment of Communism in
Asia as well as in Europe.
This represented a watershed in American foreign
policy that set the United States on a course not to be
reversed until -Richard Nixon visited the People's Republic
in 1972.

China was added to the ranks of the Soviet Union

as enemy- of the United States.
Sadly, this policy, which was to span a quarter of
the twentieth century, was founded upon a number of
underlying myths.

Primary among them was the assumption

that Communist China was the obedient tool of Moscow.
This stemmed from the dogma that all Communist governments
were united in an unswerving determination to conquer the
world.

Titoism revealed a fissure in what was believed

to be an invincible monolith, but it was ignored, as was
pit,

the subsequent Sino-Soviet split for so many years.
Rather than watching China's actions, America listened to
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its rhetoric and assumed that it was expansionist.

We

also buried our heads in the sand and based policy upon
the wishful thought that the People's Republic would expire.
These were the immediate elements of the myth, but under
lying them were beliefs that had been internalized by
American policymakers and cognizant elements of the
public— beliefs that took a quarter of a century to erode.
It was felt that China, after the Revolution of 1 9 1 1

,

had been a developing democracy that could become Christian
under Chiang, who was China's undisputed leader.

China was

our ward, and a ward that represented an almost infinite
25
market for American exports.
Such an ambience was
fertile ground for the growth of another myth— the myth
that we had "lost" China, as if China had ever been ours
to lose in the first place.
The decade that followed Truman's decision to reinvolve
America in Chinese affairs witnessed the further development
and hardening of anti-Chinese attitudes.

The administration

of Dwight David Eisenhower tolerated and abetted the McCarthy
ite emasculation of the State Department; and Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles convinced himself of the im
morality of all Communists, neutralists,, and Chinese
Communists in particular.

Having promised in 1952 that

he would end the neglect of the Far East, Dulles tried to
isolate, encircle, and bring about the collapse of the
Peking government.

The United States would recognize no

China but the Republic of China.
The Eisenhower Administration used political, economic,

22
and military ammunition against the Chinese Communist regime.
American bases were- developed rapidly in East Asia, and
mutual defense treaties were signed with those Asian states
willing to make

anti-Communist professions.

As Stalin's

quest for security in Europe had stiffened Western
resistance and had helped effect the very military encircle
ment he feared, by the same token, China's intervention
in the Korean War produced a more threatening military
posture by the United States.

Of all alliances, however,

it was the American relationship with Taiwan that most
27
exacerbated Sino-American relations.
When Peking's forces threatened the islands of Matsu
and Quemoy in 195^ and 1958, the United States provided
Chiang with the logistical support necessary to hold them.
And in May 1957* America and the Nationalists announced
that missiles capable of carrying conventional or nuclear
warheads were being based on Taiwan for the purpose of
deterring attack and repelling it if necessary.

28

John Fitzgerald Kennedy took the reins of the American
government i n ’l'96l , and his years in office were marked by
dangerous adventurism vis-a-vis Asia.

While the Administra

tion worked toward a detente with the Soviet Union, which
it was slowly coming to see as a status quo power, it
retained its Cold War posture in Asia.
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In the years immediately following Kennedy's assassina
tion in 1963» President Lyndon Baines Johnson strove to
improve Soviet-American relations, and some began to speak
of the end of the Cold War.

Progress toward China, however,

23
came more slowly.
two prongeds

American China policy was intended to be

to simultaneously reduce tensions and to

demonstrate American determination to stand firmly against
Chinese aggression.
without isolation.'

The policy was known as "containment
30

Regrettably, Johnson perpetuated Kennedy's decision
to draw the line on Chinese "aggression" in Vietnam.

No

one seemed to notice that the Chinese had much less to do
with the Vietnamese struggle than they claimed--"that
Vietnamese Communism was no more an extension of Chinese
power than Chinese Communism was of Russian power. 31
In the muddy morass of Southeast Asia, the quest for normal
ized relations with China bogged down.
Richard Milhous Nixon became President of the United
States in 19^9* and slowly, a series of actions indicated
his desire to improve relations 'with China.

Travel and

trade restrictions were eased and the Seventh Fleet's
mission in the Formosa Straits was brought to an end.
Finally, in February 1972, the first United States
President in history visited China.

32

America was coming

to deal with the Dragon as pragmatically as it dealt with
the. Bear.

The events that occur are essential information for
anyone who seeks to understand American foreign policy,
but just as important is a basic knowledge of how policy
is made.

The Second World War brought with, it a revolution

in the foreign policymaking process.

New instruments and

zh

agencies became integral parts of international relations:
foreign aid, increasingly complex trade and monetary
arrangements,

intelligence gathering and evaluation, under

cover activities, propaganda transmission, the United
Nations and its subsidiary organizations, arms control
and weapons technology, and military planning and operations.
The State Department concurrently mushroomed into a huge
bureaucracy and lost its dominant role in the conduct of
foreign policy.

The Department of Defense developed an

international affairs component parallel to and often more
influential than the Department of State, and from Dulles’
death in 1959 until Kissinger’s assumption of the role, the
Secretary of State ceased to be an officer of first importance
for the conduct of foreign affairs.

The Secretary and his

Department were overshadowed by special advisers to the
President and their staffs--McGeorge Bundy for Kennedy,
Walt Rostow for Johnson, and Henry Kissinger for Nixon,
33
until Kissinger became Secretary of State. ^
These special advisers, or national security managers,
were forced by the nature of their jobs to be generalists.
To serve the President and keep his confidence, which was
the only source of their power, they had to be prepared to
commit themselves to any crisis wherever it occurred.

They

had to relate the rush of events into a coherent pattern
that the President could understand.

This meant that

facts had to be shoved into available theories in which
bureaucracies had big investments.

Obscure events required

location in a familiar ideological landscape.

Because of
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such a policymaking apparatus, planners were still talking
about the Sino-Soviet bloc for years after the split in
the Communist alliance had exploded into public view.

The

global manager could not afford to compromise his ideology
with contradictory facts, for his reputation rested on
being able to manipulate events according to a theory.

3A

The role of public opinion in shaping foreign policy
or in being manipulated to advance foreign policy objectives
became more controversial and complex.

National security

managers understood that public outcries and threat of
punishment at the polls did not come from spontaneous
reaction to national security decisions but from political
exploitation of these decisions by skillful adversaries—
a China Lobby with sufficient money to haunt every office
in Congress, a demagogue with enough appeal to tag an
Administration with the "loss of China" or with "twenty
years of treason." ^

In short, the boundaries between

domestic affairs and foreign affairs, never sharp even
in the simplest times, disappeared completely after
1 9 4 5 .36

This crumbling of traditional boundaries, tenuous
as those boundaries may have been, profoundly affected
American China policy between 19^5 and 1972, which was
primarily an outgrowth of domestic politics, shaped by
myth, misperception, and missed opportunities.

Elements

of the domestic political scene in the U.S., including
tenacious lobbying organizations and ambitious politicians
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such as the China bloc, the China Lobby, the Committee
of One Million, and Senator Joseph McCarthy, attacked
the Europe-oriented Truman Administration where it was
most vulnerable and charged it before the American
public with the "loss" of a potentially Christian,
democratic China— a China with a large market for Ameri
can goods.

This mythical portrait was compounded by the

misperception that the People’s Republic was a dangerous,
expansionist power on the verge of expiration.

Adhering

to such myths and misperceptions, American policymakers
missed opportunities for more pragmatic Sino-American
relations (e.g. American failure to court moderate
elements in China in the spring of 19^9)» and postwar
American China policy became locked into unreasonable
7

postures.

The rise of the national security managers

and the concurrent decline in the importance of the
State Department added to the paucity of China policy
between 19^5 and 1972.
Elements of the American domestic political scene
such as the various China lobbyists, McCarthy, and the
transformed foreign policymaking bureaucracy affected
much more than American relations with the People’s
Republic of China, however.
bigger than that.

The mistake was much

In Chapter II we will investigate

how these elements affected the domestic intellectual and
political environments; and Chapter III will deal with how
they contributed to misperception of the Sino-Soviet split
on the part of three American professional groups.
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CHAPTER II
CREATION OF ORTHODOXY:
THE CHINA BLOC, THE CHINA LOBBY,
THE COMMITTEE OF ONE MILLION, AND JOSEPH MCCARTHY

The 19^0's and 1950's were a time of tremendous
strain in American politics.

They were wracked with

the harsh realities of a World War, an incipient Cold
War, Communist victory in China, and the Korean War.
To these international strains were added the disruptive
tensions that exploded in McCarthyism at home.
The American public's reaction to these events was
confused and befuddled, especially concerning events in
China.

Americans had long thought of themselves as the

protectors and benefactors of the Chinese, and what they
knew of realities in China was nebulous at best.

They

were unable to believe that the Chinese would substitute one
form of government for another without some form of American
consultation.

It was a simple step from such an attitude

ijo the conviction that American policy had been designed
intentionally to hand China to the Communists.
This attitude among the population provided fertile
ground for the congressional China bloc and the China
Lobby.

These groups worked together in the forties and
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fifties to support Chiang Kai-shek against Mao Tse-tung,
and to discredit anyone and anything that could be construed
as opposition to Chiang.

Before Mao's success in 19^9>

their primary objective was to obtain increased aid for
the Nationalists, who were led, of course, by Chiang Kai-shek.
This necessitated stressing the importance of Nationalist
China to American security.

After 19^9* primary attention

was given to preventing American recognition of the People's
Republic of China and blocking its admission to the United
Nations.

The China Lobby and the China bloc were joined,

in 1950, by the junior senator from Wisconsin, Joseph
McCarthy.

Another group, the Committee of One Million,

carried the China Lobby's mantle through the 1960's.
In pursuance of their objectives, the groups listed
above became catalysts for defining anti-Communism, pushing
American political thought and action to the right, and
restricting the scholar of Asian studies to apolitical
scholarship.

During the process, reputable Asia specialists

in the government, academia, and journalism were discredited,
and American foreign policy was frozen unrealistically by
the silencing of rational and informed dissent.

It should

be remembered, however, that none of this could have been
accomplished without the receptivity of the American
people.^
Many issues were exploited by the China bloc, the
China Lobby, McCarthy, and later the Committee of One
Million in pursuit of their objectives, but seven events
were most salient.

Major exploitation of these events
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occurred after the Communist victory in China in 19^9*
which in several cases was a number of years after the
events had taken place.

These seven events were the

Yalta agreement, the Amerasia affair, the resignation of
Patrick Hurley, the failure of the Marshall mission,
the "spy ring" revelations of the ex-Communists, the
conviction of Alger Hiss, and the war m

Korea.

How these events were exploited is a long and involved
story that is secondary to our purpose.

What is central

is that we gain some understanding of the effect of the
gradual acceptance of a well-defined propaganda line,
i.e., that China had been essential to American national
security; that it was "lost" as the result of deliberate
treachery by various private Asia specialists and State
Department officials; and that further damage had to be
prevented by non-recognition of the People's Republic
of China and its exclusion from the United Nations.

The

evolution of this line into American political orthodoxy
affected non-governmental American Asia specialists
including academicians,

journalists, and scholarly organiza

tions and foundations.

It also affected governmental

specialists, most of whom were State Department employees.

American Asia specialists, who were few in number in the
19^ 0 's and '5 0 's, tended to be divided into two schools of
opinion.-^

One group was interested in the more traditional China

of the Christian missions, the treaty ports, and the Kuomintang, as they were most familiar with those elements of
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Chinese society which had absorbed Western ways.

They

believed that Chiang Kai-shek could retain control of
China with only a minimum of help from the United States,
and that he represented democratic forces in the American
sense.

The victory of these democratic forces would result

in a China which would be anti-Soviet and pro-American.
The group as a whole believed that all Communists were
tools of Moscow, and were, therefore,
America.

in conflict with

They tended to reduce all foreign policy questions

to a problem of Communism versus anti-Communism,

a problem

which they saw as essentially one of morality rather than
one of power.

Among American military personnel, adherents

to this school of opinion included General Claire Lee
Chennault, General Douglas MacArthur, Major General
Patrick J. Hurley, and Vice Admiral Oscar C. Badger.
Those of the second school of opinion placed greater
emphasis upon revolutionary China.

Where the first group

concentrated their attention upon'those who were in power,
the second focused upon their opponents.

They either

supported the policy of noninvolvement that America had
at least partially attempted toward China after 19^5* or
they criticized that policy on the basis that it was tied
too intimately to Chiang.

The most important question for

this group was not which Chinese forces were more proAmerican, but which were more likely to win.

These

specialists believed that the Communists would probably
control Chinab future, and that the United States should
not, therefore, alienate them.

Military supporters of

3^

this view included General Joseph’W. Stilwell, General
George C. Marshall, and Major General David G. Barr.
No civilian government specialists appear to have
adopted the view of the first group after 19^5 *

On

the other hand, a long list supported the second position.
Among them were John Carter Vincent, John P. Davies, Jr.:,
John S. Service, and Oliver Edmund Clubb.
The overwhelming majority of civilian specialists
in non-governmental positions supported the view that
Chiang would lose if left to run things his way, and that
he should be forced to meet American conditions for aid.
Indeed, this was the prevailing view between 1 9 ^ and 19^9*
Adherents included such academicians as John King Fairbank, Nathaniel Peffer, Owen Lattimore, Lawrence Rosinger,
T. A. Bisson, Berk Bodde, Harold M. Vinacke, Charles P.
Fitzgerald, Benjamin Schwartz, Kenneth Latourette, William
Johnstone, W. W. Lockwood, and Dorothy Borg.
After the Communist victory in China, a few academic
specialists began to voice the argument that those special
ists who had expressed a belief in the ultimate triumph
of the Communists had actually contributed, by such
expression, to the Communist victory.

Some of them also

argued that such specialists were either pro-Communist
or the Communists* dupes.

The most prominent members

of this group were David Rowe, William McGovern, Karl
Wittfogel, Kenneth Colegrove, and George E. Taylor.
These views were largely unpublicized until after the
Communist victory, though they may have been held before
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then.

This early silence meant, in practice, that the

government, news media, and scholarly organizations came to
be dominated in the period from 19^

to 19^9 by those who

adhered to the Stilwell view.
Under such circumstances, it was necessary for the
pro-Nationalist spokesmen to discredit the prevailing
school of thought.

Asia specialists’ reputations were

called into question through repeated accusations of
"Communist connections."

In other words, the attack on

American policy toward China was accompanied from the
beginning by direct, personal attacks upon anti-Chiang
specialists.
One of the earliest of these attacks came in 1 9 ^
when G. Barry O ’Toole accused an academic Asia specialist,
Nathaniel Peffer, of having rehashed " ’in meticulous
detail all the standard lies devised by Red propaganda
and all the misleading half-truths urged by unintelligent
American criticism.'"^

A new element joined the pro-Nationalist spokesmen
in 1950.

The China bloc had spearheaded the main assault

against the Truman Administration’s effort to develop a
viable China policy in the winter of 19^9-50, but when
Senator Joseph McCarthy entered the scene on February 9»
1950 with his charges of Communism in the Department of
State, he gave both new direction and new intensity to the
attacks of the China bloc and China Lobby on the TrumanAcheson Far Eastern policy.

His speech at Wheeling,
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West Virginia,

in which he told the members of the local

Women's Republican Club that he had a list of 205 persons
in the State Department known to the Secretary of State
as Communists and still shaping foreign policy, was to
have fateful consequences.

Earlier charges of Administra

tion appeasement- in Asia were transmuted under McCarthy's
influence to accusations that policy was the result of a
pro-Communist conspiracy in Washington.

McCarthy had

seen a chance to build his own political future by playing
upon the public's anxieties, and he pursued this chance
with callous disregard for truth or consequences. 7
In the spring of 1950, the disruptive effects of
McCarthyism could be seen everywhere, but the greatest
impact was on the conduct of Far Eastern policy.

Moves

to cleanse the Far Eastern Division of the State Department
had been initiated as a result of General Hurley's charges
before McCarthy came on the scene.

Among the more

important persons transferred during this first period
were John Paton Davies, advisor to Stilwell at Kunming;
John Carter Vincent, counselor at the embassy-at Chung
king and later head of the Division of Far Eastern
Affairs; and John S. Service, third secretary at Chungking.
Their error, in each case, was reporting the weakness of
the Nationalists and the mounting strength of the Commun.

.

8

ists.

When McCarthy launched his attacks, he made no
direct charges against Davies but specifically singled
out Service and Vincent as being pro-Communist.

Both
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men were cleared after a series of investigations and
loyalty reviews, but pressure was too great to allow them
to remain in the Department.

Service and Vincent were

ousted in 1951» and 0. Edmund Clubb followed in 1952.
Davies was fired in 195^-

With Davies’ departure, not a

single experienced China specialist remained in the Depart
ment on the policymaking level.

No better example could

be found of the oppressive hand of McCarthyism on the
operations of the State Department than the loss of such
men, against whom no valid evidence of Communist sympathies
9
was ever produced.
Another consequence of McCarthyism was the suppression
of objective reporting on China by the best-informed
observers in the journalistic and academic worlds.

Their

mistake was that they agreed with State Department specialists
on the bankruptcy of the Nationalist regime, the futility
of extending aid to Chiang, and the advisability of
complete disengagement from the civil war in China.
These China experts included such scholars and
journalists as Owen Lattimore, John King Fairbank, Edgar
Snow, Nathaniel Peffer (who had come under attack as
early as 19^4), Joseph Barnes, Harold Isaacs, and T. A.
Bisson.

In a study published in I96I , Robert Newman

reported that between 19^5 and 1950 the above group of
writers had reviewed in the New York Times twenty-two
of thirty books dealing with China, and in the Herald
Tribune, thirty out of thirty-five.

Between 1952 and 1956,

however, none of them appeared in the book review pages
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of either newspaper.^
The restraints imposed on these writers left an
open field for right-wing publicists such as John Flynn,
Felix Wittmer, and Freda Utley to shape opinion according
to their views.

The virtual suppression of factual

reporting on the Far East greatly widened the ever
present gap between myth and reality in both official
and popular understanding of China.

11

The attack upon Owen Lattimore is an outstanding
example of what happened to non-governmental Asia specialists during this infamous period of American history.

12

Lattimore had come under serious public scrutiny in an
article by Alfred Kohlberg published in October 19^5*
He remained under constant attack for almost five years in
\
media ranging from Columbia (a publication of the Knights
of Columbus), to the floor of the United States Senate.
Finally, in March 1950, Senator McCarthy presented in the
Senate chamber a resume of all of Kohlberg's attacks on
Lattimore.

These charges made bold headlines across the

country and focused extensive public attention upon the
scholar.
Subsequent to McCarthy's charges, a long series of
hearings was held by the Tydings Committee, a subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

Two former

Communists, Freda Utley and Louis Budenz, added to McCarthy's
charges.

Budenz accused Lattimore of being a member of

a Communist cell in the Institute of Pacific Relations
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and suggested that he was a sinister architect of Far
Eastern policy and even a Russian spy.
The majority of the subcommittee rejected the testimony
and its implications.

They concluded that Lattimore was

no spy, that there was nothing to support the charge that
he was a Communist, and that his influence on American
Far Eastern policy had been no greater than that of hundreds
of other specialists who voiced opinions.
In July 1951» however, the Internal Security Subcommittee
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, under Senator McCarran
as chairman, began an inquiry into the Institute of Pacific
Relations that again centered on Lattimore.

As a result

of these hearings, the subcommittee concluded that
” 'Lattimore was for some time, beginning in the middle
1930's, a conscious, articulate instrument of the Soviet
,lf13
conspiracy.'"
As a result of these hearings, Lattimore endured,
almost three years of litigation on charges of perjury
resulting from statements made during the subcommittee
investigations.

He was not convicted and was legally

vindicated, but his scholarly reputation was devastated
by the fact that those accusations had been sanctioned
by the United States Senate.

In addition, the mere

mention that any Asia specialist had been in any way
associated with Lattimore was enough to cast doubt on
that specialist's integrity.
Thus, one of the effects of McCarthyism was the destruc
tion of the reputations and influence of many of the most

^0
prominent non-governmental Asia specialists in America.
These effects also extended to the organizational frame
work within which Asia specialists functioned and through
which their knowledge was channeled.

The Institute of

Pacific Relations, for example, was shrouded with such
suspicion that it was forced to fold for lack of funds.

lk

A source from which McCarthy drew much of his informa
tion and which proved to, be a disturbing influence on
policy was the vague entity that came to be known as the
China Lobby.

Not to be confused with the congressional

China bloc, although often in close association with it,
the China Lobby was composed of officials from the National
ist embassy in Washington, their paid propaganda agents, and
many rabid anti-Communists drawn from the ranks of American
businessmen, retired Army officers, and conservative State
Department specialists.

Alfred Kohlberg, a businessman,
1<
was the Lobby's most direct link with Senator McCarthy. ^
The China Lobby as it was originally constituted
eventually faded away.

Its place was taken by a group

initially called the Committee for One Million Against
the Admission of Communist China into the United Nations.
It sprang from a movement on the part of pro-Nationalists
to block what for a time appeared to be a possibility
that America would reverse its position on the representa
tion issue.

Having succeeded in its goal in 1953» the

original Committee disbanded and reorganized as the
Committee of One Million to throw its influence behind a
broader campaign to ensure the complete political isolation

^1

of the People's Republic of China.
In 1966, the Committee enrolled on its list no less
than 33^ members of Congress.

Marvin Liebman,

its secretary,

stated that the Committee's purpose was to arouse congression
al and public opinion against the admission of Communist
China to the United Nations, diplomatic recognition, and
trade relations.^
It is impossible to unravel the threads that bound
together the congressional China bloc, the China Lobby,
Senator Joseph McCarthy, and later the Committee of One
Million.

They worked separately as well as together.

Yet always in the background was the same hard core of
anti-Communists who remained convinced that American
policy should be to support Chiang and make no concessions
to M a o .
The total effects of these combined groups upon
American domestic and foreign affairs would be impossible
to measure, but some generalizations can be made.

The

dismissal of such dissenters as Davies, Clubb, Service,
and Vincent from the Department of State made the risks
of informed criticism far too great for the majority of
officials.

For the most part, such criticism ceased,

eliminating intelligent debate as a part of the policy
making process.

The discrediting of Lattimore and others

pushed Asia scholars into conservatism.
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Until very

recently, few scholars of Asia cared to remind their
classes, or themselves, that the scholarly work being
done was largely the produce of men who had either survived

kz

or missed a purge.

With few exceptions,

of China specialists survived:

only two kinds

the cold warriors

who believed in an international Communist conspiracy, and
those who retreated into a limbo where value-free truth
was always equidistant between any two current extremes.

18

The institutional framework through which non-governmental
specialists worked was damaged.

Journalists were also affected.

Theodore White did not write on China for a long while.
Edgar Snow continued to write, but from a base in Switzer
land rather than the United States.

The quality of

material on China fell off dramatically, partially because
of the silence of those who had previously dominated the
field and partially because of the wall which separated
iq
the United States from China. 7 In short, the Cold War
ethic was internalized by an entire nation, and a
political orthodoxy was created.
The propaganda of the China bloc, the China Lobby,
the Committee of One Million, and- Senator Joseph McCarthy
triumphed in a society predisposed to its reception.
An atmosphere of paranoia was created in the United
States, and this atmosphere unquestionably carried over
into American foreign policy.

It was in such an ambience

that discussion of the Sino-Soviet antagonisms first began,
and it was this Cold War intellectual and political
environment that directed and for many years confined
the perception of the Sino-Soviet split that is the
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subject of Chapter III.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

Ross Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics
(New York: Macmillan, I96O; reprint e d.f New York:
Octagon Books, 197^; edited with an introduction by
Richard Kagan), p. 152
.
Richard Kagan, in Introduction to The China Lobby
in American Politics, p. ix.
3
Ibid., p. ix.
A
'
Koen, pp. 56-57*
^The following discussion of American Asia experts
and their opinions draws upon Koen, pp. 113-116.
^G. Barry O'Toole, quoted in Koen, p. 118.
^Foster Rhea Dulles, American Policy Toward Communist
China, 19^9-1969 (New York:
Thomas Y. Crowell Company,
1972), pp. 75-76.
In The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism:
Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security,
19^6-19^8 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1970; 1st
Schocken Paperback edition, 197^)» Richard Freeland offers
the interesting analysis that the emotional and political
forces upon which McCarthy capitalized were fully developed
by 19^8.
These emotions were aroused and a Cold War
consensus emerged, Freeland argues, as the result of a
deliberate and organized effort by the Truman Administra
tion in 19^7-19^8 to mobilize support for the Marshall
Plan.
The Administration combined the propaganda of crisis
mentality with police activities (deportment of subversive
aliens, the Federal Employee Loyalty Program, the Attorney
General's list) to create a consensus that would guarantee
the passage of its European Recovery Program to "save
Europe from Communism."
I find such an analysis intriguing
food for thought.
^Dulles, p. 81.
^Ibid., p. 81.

10rbid.. pp. 83-85.
11It>id. . pp. 83-85.

12
The following discussion of what happened to Owen
Lattimore draws upon Koen, pp. 119-131•
13

1
IPR Hearings, Report t p. 216, quoted in Koen,
pp. 128-129.
*^Dulles, p. 88.
^ Ibid. , p. 88.
^ Ibid., pp. 88-8 9 .
17 This opinion, expressed by Richard Kagan in his
Introduction to The China Lobby in American Politics,
supports the contention I originally made in 1973» and
that appears in this work in the conclusion, that China
scholars were hampered by fear of censure in expressing
their perceptions of the Sino-Soviet split.
^ O r ville Schell, "Melby:
The Mandate of Heaven,"
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 1 (January 1970):

5^-58.
^^Sandra Hawley, "The China Myth at Mid-Century"
(Ph.D. dissertation, Case Western Reserve University,
1973), p. 28^.

CHAPTER I I I

AMERICAN PERCEPTION OF THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT:
1956-1972

We have seen that foreign policy between 19^5 and
1972 was very different from what it had been before
the Second World War.

Any separation of foreign and

domestic affairs had totally disappeared, and the national
security advisor, whose power came directly from the
President and was subject to his whim, had greatly
displaced the traditional power of State Department
personnel.

Myth and misperception combined with missed

opportunities to freeze American policy toward China
in an unrealistic mold.

Although the Chinese Communists

had been interested in improving relations with the
United States as late as June l9^5f we ignored them,
and with the help of propaganda bombardment from the
China bloc, the China Lobby, and Senator Joseph McCarthy,
we came to believe what we were predisposed to believe—
that the United States had "lost" a potentially Christian,
democratic China— a China with a tremendous market for
American goods.

This loss, we believed, was designed

and carried out by Communist sympathizers in the United
States whose positions varied from State Department
officials, to academic Asia specialists, to newspaper
46
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reporters.

The beautiful China these traitors had

caused us to lose had been transformed into an expansion
ist Communist Dragon--the puppet on a string held in
Moscow.

And the Soviet Union and the People*s Republic

of China, or Red China, as we called it, were united in
blissful agreement to overthrow the world.
Such was the political and intellectual environment
of the United States by the mid-1950*s.

Informed dissent

to orthodoxy was mute; dissent was un-American.
theless, that orthodoxy was wrong.

None

In the following

pages, we'will discuss the factors which did indeed
contribute to a giant fissure in the Sino-Soviet monolith,
the events of the fissure's history, and the perception
of the split by three groups of American professionals.
What we will find should not be surprising to the reader
who has gone with us thus far, but this study is no
less disturbing because its results can be anticipated
partially.

After all, we are discussing years of ill-

conceived policy toward major world powers.

We are

discussing a mistake whose reverbations we still feel.

Most informed observers of Sino-Soviet affairs date
the beginning of serious antagonisms between the two
Communist giants from Khrushchev's secret speech at the
Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in
February 1956.

We will look at the publications and

public statements of academicians,

journalists, and
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policymakers dealing with the rift between 1956 and
1972 when the Sino-American rapproachment radically
altered the balance of world power.

These professional

groups have been selected for study because they offer
informed opinion that has been assumed, traditionally,
to have some input in the foreign policymaking process.
It would help our understanding of professional
perception of the split if we had some idea of what
contributed to the conflict between the two countries.
There were many factors.

The firs't and most important

was a long history of hatred and mistrust.

In addition,

each country felt that the other was a corruptor of
Marxism.

The Russians resented Mao's claim that he was

the Asian Marx and his egocentric desire to go down in
history as one of the prophets of Communism rather than
one of its disciples.

The Russian elevation of Lenin

could hardly be considered less egocentric, however.
Differences in the political environments of Communist
China and Communist Russia also gave rise to divergence
of outlook.

The sense of apprehension on the part of

Chinese Communist leaders because of the existence of
the Taiwan regime was significant.

Some, scholars would

argue that there was no parallel to this in the Soviet
environment, and that much of Chinese Communist militancy
could be attributed to fear of an East-West detente at
China's expense.
economic.

Another factor in the conflict was

The Soviet Union was becoming a "have"

nation while China remained a "have not" nation.
military element was also salient.

A

As the Chinese

Communists had no atomic or nuclear weapons until 1964,
they had to rely upon Soviet military power which was
not always at Chinese disposal.

Still another factor

that contributed to differences between the two countries
might be called their separate revolutionary interests.
In the perspective of both countries, the world was in
revolutionary ferment and ultimately destined to become
Communist, but in hastening this process,

differences of

priority, of sectionalism, and of timing arose.

For

example, for Khrushchev to have split DeGaulle away
from the Western alliance would have been a bigger
prize than a Communist Algeria, but for Mao, a Chinesesupported Algerian insurrection seemed to be the gateway
to North Africa.^
Just as important as the factors contributing to
the split were the events which made its history.. It
has been said that "the three years from Stalin's death
until the Soviet Communist Party's Twentieth Congress
in February 1956 was the only real period of friendship
between the Russians and the Chinese."

3

Khrushchev's

speech at the congress denouncing Stalin's "cult of
personality" was the opening salvo of what was to become
a mighty feud.

Resentful of Khrushchev's failure to

consult them before launching this attack, the Chinese
4
subsequently raised the issue of polycentrism.
Although

the dispute evolved privately for some time, points of
difference apparently arose even during the days of
maximum collaboration.

Signs of discord were discernible

in 1958, but special knowledge of Communist jargon was
required to detect them.

The first open indication of

antagonism came in April i960 with the Chinese publica
tion of a three-part article commemorating Lenin.^

It

argued that an unnamed but clearly indicated Soviet
leadership had betrayed Leninism, and the Soviets responded
with articles attacking Chinese positions.
open, the controversy mushroomed.

Once in the

Both Chinese and

Soviet spokesmen sought support among other Communist
parties, and in August i960 the Soviets applied an
economic squeeze on the Chinese by withdrawing all Soviet
technicians from China.

The situation was made even
s

more difficult for the Chinese by the fact that the
Russian technicians took all of their blueprints with
them.

In the autumn of 196'lf Khrushchev openly denounced

Peking's principal supporter, the leadership of the
Albanian Communist Party, accusing them of "errors"
committed by the Chinese.

In 1962, the two countries

clashed bitterly over the handling of the Cuban missile
crisis and the Chinese attack on India.

Peking began

criticizing Khrushchev by name in I963, which may have
contributed to his ouster in 1964.

The Brezhnev-Kosygin

team immediately ended anti-Chinese polemics, apparently
trying to normalize relations, and Peking responded
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favorably.

However, in 1968 the Soviet invasion of

Czechoslovakia and the enunciation of the "Brezhnev
doctrine"

(asserting Moscow's right to intervene in

Communist countries where policies deviated from
Kremlin standards) convinced Chinese leaders that the
Russians were capable of attacking China as well.

By

I969 Peking's border troops numbered more than a million,
and Soviet military build-up had reached huge propor
tions.

Skirmishes occurred on March 2, March 15» anc*

again in mid-June.

On September 11 a brief but decisive

meeting between Chou En-lai and Kosygin took the Chinese
and Russians off their collision course.

They agreed

to open talks which began on October 19» but after more
than a year of negotiation, the only visible result was
that the slide toward war had been arrested in late
1969.

The talks did nothing to halt the exchanges of

vitriolic propaganda, nor did they discourage the continuing
reinforcement of frontier zones.

In 1971 and 1972 the

Kremlin was still building up its troop strength in
Siberia and Central Asia while the Chinese were stiffen
ing their air defenses with new radar networks, surfaceto-air-missiles, and other modern equipment.^

The political and intellectual climate described in
the preceding chapter of this work profoundly affected
perception and interpretation of the events detailed
above.

The earliest publications on Sino-Soviet relations
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following Stalin's death emphasized Russo-Chinese
solidarity.

In 1954, C. M. Chang said that Peking's

sense of solidarity with Moscow in an international
cause went much deeper than most observers imagined.
Any appearance of their being out of step was merely a
strategem to further befuddle a confused world.

"Those

who expect Moscow and Peking to get in each other's
way and trip each other up will be disappointed."

7

Another publication clearly representative of its
time was Moscow-Peking Axis. Strengths and Strains (1957)»
by Howard Boorman, Alexander Eckstein, Philip E. Mosely,
and Benjamin Schwartz.

This collection of essays was

intended to educate the reader to the implications of
the Sino-Soviet alliance, and the consensus was that
"the general community of belief and purpose underlying
the Sino-Soviet alliance give prospect of its being a
0
reasonably durable and highly effective union."
G.

F. Hudson, also in 1957» expressed opinions

similar to those of Boorman, Eckstein, Mosely, and Schwartz.
He contended that during Stalin's lifetime there had
been no dispute between Peking and Moscow that reached
the dimensions of a publicly acknowledged conflict.
De-Stalinization and praise for collective leadership
had been embarrassing to Mao, but "now that Khrushchev
has made a clean sweep of his rivals and abruptly put
an end to collective leadership in Moscow, he and Mao
will be able to meet on equal terms as fully autocratic
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leaders of totalitarian party states,"

9

On October 6 , 1957* Christian Herter said .at a
news conference that from outward appearances it seemed
that the Russians and the Chinese were working very closely
together.^
Considering this climate of opinion, the emergence
of a school of thought considering schism between the
Soviet Union and China a myth, unimportant, and even
dangerous if pursued by the West is certainly under
standable,

Adherents to this school maintained that the

Communist powers had an overriding aim in common— the
conquest of the non-Communist world— and that they pursued
this aim relentlessly and in cooperation.
The most radical representative of such thought
was the November 5» 19^0 supplement to National Review.
"Bear and Dragon, What Is the Relation Between Moscow
and Peking?"

In his article, "Operation Will-o*-the-

Wisp," which served as an introduction to the supplement,
James Burnham ridiculed C. L. Sulzberger and Joseph
Alsop for suggesting the possibility of a break between
China and the U.S.S.R.

He continued by stating that

although most persons believed the Sino-Soviet conflict
formula to be true, this did not guarantee that they
were correct.

"*The Sino-Soviet conflict* may be only

the latest in the fifty-seven-year series of strategic
will-o*-the-wisps that have beckoned the West away from
the main road"

11

In the same supplement, David Nelson Rowe expressed his
view of the Russo-Chinese relationship in "Chinese History."
According to Mr. Rowe, the dependence of the Chinese
Communists upon Russia was required by the objective
situation in which they found themselves.

Any slight,

temporary problems, if they existed, were not enough to
threaten the alliance; moreover, the Chinese Communists
could feel that in terms of China's history and tradition
their dependence was psychologically and politically
acceptable to themselves and to their people.

So far

as they sought guidance from their history, they had
no reason to wish or expect that the relationship would
12
be altered in the near future.
"Bear and Dragon, What Is the Relation Between
Moscow and Peking?" also included "Demography" by Karl
A. Wittfogel,

in which he offered the following comments

When Mao Tse-tung declared that after the
First World War the communists controlled 200
million people, that after the Second World
War they controlled 900 million people, and
that the next major holocaust would probably
destroy all remaining non-communist power
centers, he was expressing his belief in an
historical perspective that makes any idea of
a break-between Peking and Moscow palpably
absurd. ^
Similar opinions were expressed in the same supplement
1if,
15
by Natalie Grant,
Wlodzimierz Baczkowski,
_ and
16
Stefan T. Possony.
This school of thought neither began,

(as has been

illustrated), nor ended with the November 5» I960
supplement to National Review.

In I96I, A. R. Field
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published an article in which he discussed Sino-Soviet
relations.

He stated that he did not agree with

Western observers who suggested that the long-term
interests of the Soviets and Chinese would eventually
clash in Sinkiang.

The development of industries

in the area seemed to negate such an argument.

In

fact, Russian and Chinese industrial complexes appeared
to be slowly shifting closer together— a fact suggesting
that whatever antagonisms that might exist were being
17
kept well within bounds.
In 1962 the book Unity and Contradiction:

Major Aspects

of Sino-Soviet Relations contained several articles similar
to Mr. Fields' and those appearing in "Bear and Dragon,
What Is the Relation Between Moscow and P e k i n g ? . "
H. S. Tang, in "Sino-Soviet Border Regions:

Peter

Their Changing

Character," expressed the opinion that all Sino-Soviet
dealings must be viewed within the context of the two
countries'

determination to secure the victory of inter

national Communism.

He felt some observers'

judgment

that Moscow and Peking would eventually clash along their
common borders was unrealistic, for it was unlikely
that either would be willing to jeopardize the triumph
they expected for Communism by indulging in fraternal
strife, especially in such a petty area as economic
18
and physical encroachment in the border areas.
As late as I966, at least one reputable academician,

George E. Taylor, upheld this same point of view.

He

maintained that because the West still had to deal with
the bloc as a whole, the Sino-Soviet conflict made no
difference to the American position in Asia.

Peking and

Moscow still had fundamental interests in common which
would outweigh any possible differences, and he warned
that in concentrating on the dispute Americans risked
overlooking the effective unity of the Communist bloc.
Peking and Moscow could not be regarded as two utterly
separate powers, for they were not.

19

It may be noted at this point that three of the
scholars in the first school of thought, Messrs. Rowe,
Wittfogel and Taylor, were among those academicians
who, in 19^9» accused liberal Asia scholars of contributing
to Communist victory in China by the mere expression
of their beliefs.

Two of the three are China scholars.

Not all observers were quite so right-wing as those
of this first school, however, and slightly less con
servative opinions did appear'.

A second school emerged

which contended that while a shared determination to
establish Communism throughout the world set limits
on the conflicts between the Soviet Union and China,
there were indeed serious differences between them.

The

basic divergence between the first and second schools
of thought, then, was that the second acknowledged the
existence of significant tensions within the axis.
John F. Kennedy was one of the earliest observers to
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comment upon Sino-Soviet problems.:
The fragmentation of authority within
the Soviet orbit has been one of the main
gains of the post-Stalinist era.
The totali
tarian succession has not passed easily from
Stalin to Khrushchev.
There are other
Communists— Mao, Tito, <8omulka— who claim
to speak with Communism's authentic voice.
Nationalism is a force cutting into the
Soviet world as well as the Western. What
will be the full effect of the growth of
these centripetal currents remains to be
seen, but Mao is surely right in the belief
that Moscow's one total monopoly of the
gardener's craft has gone.
He continued by condemning the stifling atmosphere that
it

prevented legitimate dissent:

There have been and still

are good reasons for non-recognition of China; but we
must take care not to rigidify our policy through
ignorance, failing to detect change in the
situation when it comes.

objective

If criticism is not allowed,

policy becomes rigid and vested interests harden to
\

the point where established viewpoints cannot be
"21
altered.
As President, Kennedy changed his tune somewhat.
At a news conference on November 8 , 1961, he said that
91 none of us can talk with precision about the details
of relationships between Russia and China.

It is a

matter of surmise and on this experts may differ.
Therefore, I don't feel that it is probably useful now
for us to attempt to assess it."'

22

In December 1959 a survey of the United States'
foreign needs for the future was made public by the
Rockefeller Brothers Fund.

It had been prepared by a

fourteen-man team headed by two former assistant
secretaries of state, Adolph A. Berle, Jr. and Dean
Rusk.

The report observed that a rift in the Sino-

Soviet alliance was not to be expected in the near
future, but the coming decade might see a strain between
the two powers.

The panel warned against a policy that

might drive the two countries closer together, but
added that actions designed to split them would probably
fail.

23

Later testimony of Rusk before the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee indicated that he was
2
cognizant of Sino-Soviet differences.
Chester Bowles expressed sentiments similar to
those held by Kennedy in his senatorial days.

He believed

America had the power to play a significant role in
Asian affairs, but he questioned whether we had the
tact, subtlety,.and flexibility.

To begin, we needed

to put aside some of our doctrinaire preconceptions and
realistically examine the complexity of the Sino-Soviet
relationship.

"Deep potential differences exist between

Chinese and Russian Communism as a result of the radically
different cultures, experiences and leaderships in the
i
23
two countries." ^

He added that no outsider could be

certain of the present or future state of Sino-Soviet
relations, but the assumption that there was a rigid,
monolithic, and unchangeable alliance was out of date.
Consequently, efforts of State Department officials to
depict Khrushchev as the leader of a world Communist
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movement and to chastise him for not keeping China in
line were self-defeating and naive.

He proposed that

we realize that both Communist alliances and Communist
nations were subject to the eroding effects of nationalism, history, and economics.

26

A. Doak Barnett, a well-known China scholar, believed
in i960 that strong ideological, political, military,
and economic ties united Peking and Moscow.

They shared

common aims and gained mutual advantages from their
alliance, and both would pay a tremendous price if it
were dissolved.

Yet, beneath the surface, there were

significant tensions, problems, and differences that could
-not be denied.

27

Another member of the second school, Roderick
MacFarquhar, said in "Sino-Soviet Relations" that
economic considerations would seem unlikely to allow
friction to endanger monolithic solidarity within the
bloc, but that China's dissent from Soviet Russia's
political concepts was indeed serious.

28

Peter Mayer

said essentially the same thing in Sino-Soviet Relations
Since the Death of Stalin.2^
In I96I, Zbigniew Brzezinski acknowledged that ideology
was a source of friction between Russia and China, yet
he argued that the dispute had been and would continue
to be confined by three limits, consciously observed
by both parties;
1)

Both parties have recognized that

6o
both would lose by an open split, hence
that unity must be preserved; 2 ) each
realized that the other’s leadership is firmly
entrenched and that, for better or worse,
Khrushchev would have to deal with Mao Tsetung and vice versa . . . ; 3) the Chinese,
for the time being at least, have striven to
reassure the Soviets that they are not trying
to displace them as leaders of the bloc but
are merely anxious to persuade them to adopt
a different strategy. . . .
The bloc is not splitting and is not
likely to split.
To talk of a Sino-Soviet
conflict, or even war between them, merely
illustrates a profound misconception of the
essence of the historical phenomenon of
Communism, which, while affected by tradition
al national considerations, has from its
very beginning reflected a conscious emphasis
.on supra-national perspectives.—
Brzezinski elaborated in "The Problematics of SinoSoviet Bargaining,"

(1962).^*

He felt that serious

elements of friction within the alliance could only
be described as those between two unequal units that
32
could win "only if they stay together,"
or each lose
alone.

This resulted in a conflict with an overriding

common interest, the nature of which was not likely to
be altered substantially.

"Naive tinkering and continu

ous wishful talk about a Sino-Soviet split can,have
only one effects

to draw them closer together.

One

cannot promote a heresy in a church to which one does
33
not belong." ^
Kurt London, who edited Unity and Contradiction,
in which Brzezinski’s 1962 article appeared, stated
that he was unwilling to make any concrete predictions
as to where conflicts between the Soviets and Chinese
would lead the alliance, but he personally was reluctant
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to believe they would sacrifice their most valuable
34
asset--the unity of the socialist camp.
That same year, Donald S. Zagoria published a
monograph, The Sino-Soviet Conflict. 1956-61, in which
differences between the Chinese and Russians were
covered thoroughly; yet he also minimized the possibility
3<
of an open s c h i s m . ^ An article he published in Foreign
*a6

Affairs reflected the same thought.
William E. Griffith continued along the same
line:

"One should still beware of predicting an in

evitable, total and above all permanent Sino-Soviet
break."
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The same thought was voiced in later years
OQ

by Franz Michael^

3Q

and Robert A. Scalapino.

And in

I97I 9 0. Edmund Clubb published what seems to be a
logical extension of such thought. China and Russia:
The Great G ame.' Clubb believed that the Sino-Soviet
rift was of Mao Tse-tung* s personal choice and making,
instead of representing a Moscow decision or even the
consensus of the eighth Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Central Committee plenum before Mao's purge:

"The

quarrel was between two party leaderships that happened
to be in charge of their respective states."

40

He also

felt that from the time when Moscow directed its attack
specifically against Mao, it was apparent that if Mao
were to be removed from power and his hostile policy
toward Russia were abandoned by his successors, the
Sino-Soviet alliance could once more be made into a
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working political and economic arrangement.

The

relationship could not he restored to its 1950-56
condition, but Mao would pass, and China would be directed
by a new leadership--probably a more pragmatic one.
And with the advent of pragmatists to power
in Peking, the Sino-Soviet alliance could,
without any great difficulty, be made to
operate in a fashion that would service some
of China's basic needs— and would, in correspond
ing satisfaction of a Soviet desideratum,
preserve China as a buffer zone between
Soviet Siberia and the America^naval and
air power in the West Pacific.
A third school of thought eventually emerged which
held that the tensions within the axis acknowledged by
those of the second school rendered a break inevitable.
Adherents to this school argued that the interests of
the two Communist partners were ultimately incompatible.
Viewpoints varied depending upon the importance accorded
to the place of ideology in Russian and Chinese motivation.
One position was that Russia was becoming a status quo
power, its conflict with China arising from the fact
that its interests necessarily diverged from those of
a partner whose population pressure and revolutionary
fervor drove it to expand at all cost.

Another view was

that the national interests of the two cpuntries conflicted
and that competition for control over border areas
such as Outer Mongolia must lead them to split.

Finally,

some within this school maintained that rupture between
China and Russia was inevitable because the Communist
system demands absolutely centralized control, and

neither Russia nor China would relinquish its claim
to power.

ho

One of the earliest publications to emphasize
tensions between China and Russia so strongly as to
imply a split was Allen S . Whiting's "Contradictions
in the Moscow-Peking Axis," published in the Journal
of Politics. February 1958.

Mr. Whiting discussed the

military, economic, and ideological aspects of the rela
tionship at length, ending his article with an analogy
between Sino-Soviet and Anglo-American relations:
The concatenation of military, economic, and
ideological trends in the Sino-Soviet alliance
point to increasing independence of Peking
from Moscow.
If the comparison with the
Anglo-American relations offers any insight
it lies in dismissing alternative categories
of 'satellite' and 'equal partners.'
Neither
category offers an accurate enough descrip
tion of reality to be meaningful in a wide
range of specific instances.
Just as Stalin's
view of the Anglo-American alliance suffered
from a'simplistic analysis remaining fixed
over time, so certain Western estimates of
the Sino-Soviet alliance appear remote and rigid,
requiring close appraisal of the dynamics of
divisive as well-as of cohesive forces in
trend analysis. ^
Mr. Whiting carried his analysis further in "Conflict
Resolution in the Sino-Soviet Alliance," in which he
stated that two things seemed certain.

In the 1960's,

serious problems confronted coordination within the
Moscow-Peking axis.

As Chinese power increased relative

to that of the Soviet Union and as the interests of
the two countries expanded geographically, the partners
would have increasing opportunity to differ and decreasing
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opportunity to impose their will upon each other; and
by focusing upon the tensions within the axis, the West
44
could contribute toward a better response to it.
Like Whiting, the Marxist journalist Isaac Deutscher
spotted problems early.

In his syndicated article of

August 14, 1958» Deutscher discussed the Middle Eastern
turmoil, which he felt had revealed a crisis in the
Soviet-Chinese relationship.

According to Deutscher,

it was the revelation of discrepancy between Moscow's
and Peking's reactions to the events in the Middle East
that sent a gravely disturbed Khrushchev on his journey
to China.

Having gone to the brink, Khrushchev felt

disconcerted by Chinese backseat driving.

During the

three days of Mao's and Khrushchev's conference there
was hard bargaining, and there were mutual concessions.
While Khrushchev called off the planned summit meeting
over the Middle East, Mao acknowledged the merits of
summit diplomacy in general and recognized in advance
that Khrushchev would be acting correctly if he sought
another summit meeting on some future occasion.

"The

outcome was thus a token of coordination and a compromise,
which is not, however, likely to prove very s t a b l e . " ^
In December i960, Deutscher voiced his opinion that
the Declaration of the Eighty-One Communist Parties
(published by Moscow on December 6 , i960), for all its
elaborate character and stylistic elan, was not likely
to put an end to the controversy.

It would, rather,
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serve as one of those texts which each disputant could,
and unquestionably would, quote in support of his own
46
views and policies.
In 1959» G. F. Hudson was expressing opinions quite
different from those he had held in 1957-

Indeed, by

the end of the fifties he was in accord with Whiting and
Deutschers

"The decision to set up communes in China

was indeed a parting of the ways, and there is no turning

back."^
Joseph Alsop also suggested

a parting of the- ways

in September i960:
A threatened break between the Soviet Union
and Communist China looks more and more like
the missing piece in the deeply disturbing
puzzle of recent Soviet behavior. . . . Even
the smallest possibility of a break could be
counted on to exert great pressure on Khrush
chev. But the evidence suggests that the
possibility is not small.
It is no slim
chance now, but rather a strong possibility.
If a mid-October meeting between Khrushchev
and Mao fails to compose the conflict, however,
the betting will be rather better than even
on an open Sino-Soviet break at the meeting
of communist leaders over all the world that no
is expected to be held in Moscow in November.
Another observer who viewed the situation as Whiting,
Deutscher, and Alsop did was Ferdinand Lundberg.

After

having read Donald S. Zagoria's "China's Threat to
Russia," New Leader. April 24, I96I, Lundberg drew a
more far-reaching conclusion than the possibility of
Eastern and Western empires of Communism centered in
Peking and Moscow, as Zagoria had suggested.

Mr.

Lundberg maintained that Moscow and Peking were conducting

a political war on two fronts, one veiled and the other
in the open— against each other and against the bourgeois
world.

The whole history of Leninist Communism testified

that one or the other must knuckle under unless there
was to be an open competition for power.

Sharing

power was impossible under Communism; such sharing was
bourgeois.

When one considered the need of the

Communist system for absolutely centralized power it was
hard to see how one could magnify the significance of
Chinese-Russian differences.

Nationalism and culture

had been the big contradictions within Communism since
the emergence of Red China, and no Communist faction
since 1917 had voluntarily subordinated itself to
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another.
There were others who stated similar opinions.
Marvin Kalb concluded in Dragon in the Kremlin that
for economic, ideological, and military reasons, it was
clear that the Russian-Chinese alliance had been plagued
by a rash of disagreements and anxieties.

Both Peking

and Moscow seemed to realize that they were bound by a
common ideology which gave them strength, purpose, and
direction, yet they had been unable to reduce the
frequency and intensity of their disputes.

Developments

indicated that strong disruptive pressures existed within
the alliance, but it would be folly to anticipate its
dissolution owing to these pressures.

It was likely

that for the immediate future the Russo-Chinese axis

would continue to function as a viable and powerful
political, economic, and diplomatic force.

The key

phrase in Kalb's analysis was "for the immediate future.
He predicted that when China exploded a nuclear bomb
it was possible that tensions between Moscow and Peking
would force a rupture between them.

Therefore, the

United States should adopt a highly flexible foreign
policy aimed at exploiting divisive pressures so.that
Moscow and Peking would be deprived of the opportunity
of facing the U.S. as a united team.

He suggested that

the United States should recognize the People's Repub
lic of China; admit it to the United Nations; recognize
the government of Outer Mongolia; make every effort to
begin a program of exchanges with Communist China; find
areas where our interests coincided with the Soviet
Union's, and if possible, embark on joint projects;
and educate China specialists in the United S t a t e s . ^
Like Kalb, Alexander Dallin also discussed dissen
sion between the two Communist giants.

He felt that the

rift between them had stimulated competition for control
of the international Communist movement.

Unwilling

and unable to turn his back on international Communism
as a failure, Khrushchev was given the choice between
two contrary impulses in coping with dissension in the
movement.

He could strive to maintain a fictitious

unity in the Communist world, or he could revert to
classical Bolshevik principles of organization:
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determination to preserve a pure nucleus at all times.
(Lenin's Better Fewer but Better provided the formula
for the second approach.)

"Whatever the formal outcome,

the discrepancy between universal ideology and fragmented
authority points toward more, rather than less, tension
and conflict within international Communism."
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Stavro Skendi reached the same conclusion in analyzing
52
the Albanian problem.
After the polemical winter of 1962-63* there were
still those who doubted the seriousness of Sino-Soviet
antagonisms, but there were many who voiced an opposite
point of view.

In his July 3* 1963 article, Isaac

Deutscher said that over the last several years the
Russians and the Chinese had agreed to disagree, but
now they were unable to agree even on this.

"The

monolith has in fact broken; and no one can put it
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together a g a i n . E x a c t l y the same opinion was
expressed by Edward Crankshaw in The New Cold W a r s
54
Moscow v. Pekin,
and by Zbigniew K. Brzezinski (who
had completely reversed his 1962 opinion), in "Threat
55
(1963)•
56
Brzezinski held to this view in later years,
and
and Opportunity in the 'Communist Schism,"

he was supported by others such as George F.Kerman,
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Lucian P y e , ^ Richard Low e n t h a l , ^ Bernard Fall.,
William E. Griffith (who by 1967 had reversed his
1964 p o s i t i o n ) ^ and John King F a i r b a n k . ^
As Sino-Soviet animosity flared, some observers, who

came to constitute a fourth school of thought, developed
a more extreme view than that of most other commentators
Walter Z. Laqueur said in 19&2 that "for world Communism
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1961 was the year of the great schism."
Even if the
Sino-Soviet dispute could be resolved (a most unlikely
prospect), world Communism would never again be the
same.

For the more distant future, even the possibility

of war between China and the Soviet Union could not be
ruled out.
What separated Laqueur and others of similar
persuasion into a distinct school, therefore, was that
they seriously discussed the possibility of war between
Russia and China.
In 1966, Thomas W. Wolfe spoke of the possibility
of war in the future,
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and in 19^9> Harrison Salisbury*
s

War Between Russia and China appeared.

To the question,

"Is war between the Soviet Union and China inevitable?,"
Salisbury's answer in 19&9 was a qualified "no," the
qualification being that if events were permitted to
continue on the present pattern, war would become
inevitable.

He maintained that if the United States

were to take a serious role in the Sino-Soviet dispute
it needed to establish a viable relationship with
China.

Concerning the possibility of Sino-Soviet

detente following the death of Mao Tse-tung, Salisbury
stated that the possibility should not be overlooked,
because unexpected, illogical events change the course

of world history, but the odds against rapproachement

i
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were long. ^
In I 970, L. LaDany said that China, for its part,
probably did not want warj but it feared attack and was
therefore engaged in military preparation.^

Hans

Morgenthau, too, emphasized the possibility of war.
Oton Ambroz concluded in Realignment of World Power
that "it seems unlikely therefore that a change of
leadership in Peking will itself significantly affect
the substance of the dispute.

...

The Russo-Chinese

conflict has deep historic roots and the Communist
regimes were simply not able to change the hard geopolitical facts."

68

On the question of war, Ambroz

pointed out that military experts studying the logistic
infrastructure of Russia's war industry and transpor
tation system came to the conclusion that Moscow was
preparing itself for action against Red China.

A large

portion of China's armed forces and missile bases, on
the other hand, were stationed in the country's northern
and western parts along the border with the Soviet
Union.

He ruled out complete reconciliation between the

Communist big two:

"The Sino-Soviet axis was an u n 

natural alliance, and its collapse should be viewed
as natural."
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Stanley Karnow expressed similar senti-
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ments in Mao and China.
Like Salisbury, Ambroz, and Karnow, Richard Thornton
wrote of Sino-Soviet tensions.

In The Bear and Dragon:

71
Sino-Soviet Relations and the Evolution of the Chinese
People's Republic, 1949-1971t Thornton did not rule out
any relaxation of tensions between the two countries,
but he considered it unlikely.

He concluded that,

from the Soviet viewpoint at least, indications suggested
that the U.S.S.R. was more likely to develop a long
range pincer envelopment of China, while maintaining a
powerful position along the border.

71

As time passed, some observers came to believe
that while severe Sino-Soviet tensions still persisted,
the danger of war was over.

This, then, constitutes a

fifth school of thought.
One analyst in this school, Richard Lowenthal
(who had shifted from an earlier position), expressed
the opinion that the continuation of controlled conflict
between China and Russia was a more plausibles prospect
for the future than its end by either reunion or
72
catastrophe.
Michel Oksenburg presented a somewhat more sanguine
analysis:

"Following the armed clashes in 1969 over the

disputed islands in the Ussuri River in Manchuria, SinoSoviet relations have improved somewhat.

Peking and

Moscow plan increases in their trade and are engaged in
border t a l k s . " ^
On the same topic, Seymour Topping said:
Between June 1959 and October 1961, the
Chinese-Soviet alliance in effect dissolved.
the Chinese, faced with the prospect of a
lasting confrontation with Soviet military

..

.
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forces superior in strength to their own
were compelled to look for new political
and diplomatic arrangements invthe world
to bolster their position vis-a-vis Moscow.
The task was given to Chou En-lai, and he
responded with a search for new allies and
Ping-Pong diplomacy.

It could be said that in the era that began with
Russia's acquisition of advanced nuclear weapons,
Communist China's emergence as a great power, and Stalin's
death, the main fault of American policymakers lay in
misperception.

Not understanding the internal weaknesses

within the Communist world that could have offered
options for American diplomacy contributed greatly to
this misperception.

Although Sino-Soviet estrangement

has altered drastically the balance of world power,
knowledge of the split was limited to the specially
initiated alone for many years.

The following chart,*

listing the professionals in the schools of thought
discussed in these pages, should make the reasons for
this clearer.

Academicians are labeled with (A),

journalists with (J), policymakers with (P), and China
scholars are specially indicated with asterisks.
Publication dates follow the name of each author.
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School #1

School #2

Those who saw no problems
or few problems and expected
no split

Those who expected no split,
but saw severe problems
within the axis

(A)
(A)
(A)
(A)
(A)
(A)
(P)
(A)
(A)
(A)
(P)
(A)
(A)
( A)
(A)
(A)

*
*
*
*
*

c.
G.
H.
A.
P.
B.
C.
J.
D.
K.
N.
W.
S.
A.
P.
G.

Chang
Hudson
Boorman
Eckstein
Mosely
Schwartz
Herter
Burnham
Rowe
Wittfogel
Grant
Baczkowski
Possony
Field
Tang
Taylor

*57
•57
’57
•57

(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(A)
(A)
(A)
(A)
(A)
(A)
(A)
(A)
(A)
(P)

'57
'57
'57

960
960
960

96 o

960
960
961
962
966

*
#

*
*

J.
A.
D.
C.
D.
R.
z.
K.
P.
D.
W.
R.
F.
E.

Kennedy
Berle, Jr.
Rusk
Bowles
Barnett
MacFarquhar
Brzezinski
London
Mayer
Zagoria
Griffith
Scalapino
Michael
Clubb

*57, 961
*59
*59, 962
96 o

960
961
96 1 , 962
962
9 62
•>62, 962
*6 k
96 k, 966
966
971

School #3

School # k -

Those who saw problems which
they expected to cause a split

Those who talked of war

(J)
(A)
(A)
(J)
(J)
(J)
(J)
(A)
(A)
(A)
(J)
(A)
(P)
(A)
(A)
(A)
(A)

*
*
'

*

I.
A.
G.
J.
H.
M.
F.
R.
R.
A.
E.
Z.
G.
L.
B.
W.
J.

Deutscher
Whiting
Hudson
Alsop
Salisbury
Kalb
Lundberg
Lowenthal
Skendi
Dallin
Crankshaw
Brzezinski
Kennan
Pye
Fall
Griffith
Fairbank

(A)
•58,*63
•58,162
(A)
*59,* 60
(J)
'60
(J)
(A)
•60
•61
(J)
•61
(A)
•61,'66
(A)
•62
*62
'61,*63
•63, '6 6 , •72
96 k ,* 66
•66
•66
•67
•72

W.
T.
H.
L.
H.
S.
0.
R.

Laqueur
Wolfe
Salisbury
LaDany
Morgenthau
Karnow
Ambroz
Thornton

School #5
Those who believed that tensions
persisted, but danger of war had
passed
(A)
(A)
(J)

R. Lowenthal
M. Oksenburg
S. Topping

971
971
972

•62
*66
•69
*70

971
•72
*72
•72

The preceding chart represents the opinions of
thirty-seven (37) academicians, nine (9) journalists,
and eight (8) policymakers.

Among scholars, one can see

a liberal-conservative split, with twenty-three calling
for Sino-Soviet unity.

Hudson, who expected no split

in 1957, had changed his opinion by 1959-

Brzezinski

reversed his position during the winter of 1962-63 when
polemics were flying back and forth between Russia and
China, and Griffith did the same some time between
196^ and 1967.

Including these three, seventeen academi

cians expected a Sino-Soviet split.

One of this group,

Lowenthal, moved from School #3 to School #5 between
1966 and 1971-

All nine journalists expected a split,

but seven of the eight policymakers did not, at least
according to their public statements.
These figures suggest several things.

First, the

journalists as a group were more astute in perceiving
the reality of Sino-Soviet antagonisms than were the
academicians and the policymakers.

This could possibly

be attributed to the fact that journalists are by nature
more gregarious than scholars and are therefore more often
placed in situations where current events are discussed
by those who make them.

It would seem, however, that

other factors are also involved.

It was noted in an

earlier chapter of this work that journalists as well
as academicians and policymakers were affected by the
McCarthyite purges.

Theodore White stopped writing on

China for some time, and Edgar Snow changed his base

to Switzerland.

Our survey of professional perceptions

of the Sino-Soviet split would indicate, however, that
the effects of McCarthyism lingered in academia and
government much longer than in journalism.

Perhaps the

long and tedious preparation required for an. academic
career makes scholars less willing to tackle issues
that could jeopardize their positions than journalists
whose formal preparation seldom demands more than a
four-year degree.

In fairness to scholars, however,

one will note that there was evidence of suppression
of maverick works (e.g. Ross Koen's The China Lobby in
American Politics was purged from library shelves in
75
i960). J

.1 do not know of similar examples in journalism,

though they may have existed.
There is also a crucial difference between the
traditional roles of journalists and academicians.
Journalists are expected to report events as they
occur.

If the happenings of today overturn the judgment

made in yesterday's article, then so be it.
after all, is in flux.

The world,

Academic specialists, on the other

hand, in admitting they were wrong, may have to renounce
years of work upon which they have built a reputation.
Consequently, such respected and perceptive scholars as
Brzezinski were slow to give up public adherence to the
ideology of monolithic Communism.

Strict adherence to

this ideology rendered more than half of the scholars
represented in this paper incapable of perceiving the
demise of a monolith even in the face of overwhelming
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evidence pointing in that direction.
One will notice that the majority of China scholars
represented here are on the radical right or rightist
side of the spectrum.

A second implication of this

survey, then, is that the severe treatment of Asia
scholars in the late forties and early fifties left
deep scars that are evident in their writings on SinoSoviet relations.

The suggestion is that not only were

the China experts directed by ideology in this instance,
but by fear of attack.

One who has been burned is not

likely to stick his hand into another fire.
Some Asia scholars have contrasted their field and
Russian studies to stress the former's independence from govern
ment.

The fact that Russia scholars did not suffer

attack during the McCarthy era suggests to them that
the Russian field was more closely aligned with government views than the Chinese field.

There may be some

validity to this claim, but one must take into considera
tion here that Russia had not recently been "lost."
Russia scholars were not attacked because there was no
need to blame them for anything.

After all, the Russian

Revolution occurred in 1917--not 19^*9*
It is true, however, that there are differences in
the backgrounds of the majority of scholars in these two
fields.

There were few experts on the Soviet Union before

World War II.

The immediate post-war boom in Russian

studies was largely a product of interest in the Soviet

Union as the enemy.

China studies, on the other hand,

had been dominated by scholars of Chinese culture and
history.

Because the large scale study of Russia developed

initially in a Cold War context, the field came to be
dominated by professional anti-Communists, military
strategists, and Eastern European and Russian emigres.
These are interesting differences with implications
for separate periods of recent American history.

It is

possible that these differences contributed to the vehemence
of attack upon China scholars during the McCarthy era and
the relatively immune position of Russia scholars.

But

for this very reason, Russia scholars could depart from
orthodoxy sooner than Asia scholars would dare risk.
Academic discussion of Sino-Soviet relations in the late
fifties and sixties was more conservative on the part of
China scholars than on the part of other academicians,
I believe, because of their different experiences in the
McCarthy era.
Policymakers, unlike journalists and academicians,
present special problems for the historian who attempts
to analyze their statements.

Anyone familiar with

American political life would suspect that there is
often significant divergence between the privatelyheld and publicly-announced beliefs of policymakers,
resulting from the fact that they rely upon public
whim for their positions.

If some policymakers were

cognizant of the true nature of Sino-Soviet relations
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during the period we have studied, I believe there were
several reasons why they would not have made their beliefs
public.

The first reason would be the Cold War slant

of public opinion; the second would be the memory of what
happened to government Asia specialists such as 0.
Edmund Clubb, John S. Service, John Paton Davies, and
John Carter Vincent, during the McCarthy era.

Government

specialists, like China scholars and unlike Russia scholars,
suffered horribly during the McCarthy purges.

Although

some journalists suffered also, they neither spent as
many years preparing for their careers as did academicians,
nor depended upon public approval for their jobs as did
elected policymakers.

Compounding the effects of these

factors would be the conservative input of the national
security managers who emerged after World War II.

As

their power came from and depended completely upon those
they advised, they could be and were easily led into
feeding their superiors the information they most likely
wanted to hear.

I believe these factors directed the

public opinions of policymakers toward conservatism
concerning China policy and Sino-Soviet relations
between 19^5 a-nd 1972, and I have no knowledge that their
private opinions were different, although they may have
been.

The only policymaker surveyed here who made any

public statement of recognition of the Sino-Soviet
split was George Kennan, and he was no longer in govern
ment.

Thus, it would appear that there are several
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reasons for the lag in perception by policymakers as well
as by academicians and for the comparative insight of
journalists.
Another inference I draw from this survey is that
policymakers used academic opinion more than the opinions
of journalists in formulating China policy and in treating
Sino-Soviet relations between 19^5 and 1972.

I do not

mean, however, that academicians had an effective input
in the foreign policymaking process, or that the press
was not manipulated by those in power; but there was a
basic difference between the government-university rela
tionship and the government-journalistic relationship—
a difference that still exists.

The latter relationship

reveals relatively more independence.

After World War

II. area studies departments were begun in universities all
over the country.

In case after case, they were financed

through government grants.

Academicians either followed

the line of orthodoxy in order t o ’attract funds, or they
retreated into the private "think tanks."
A case in point of how the government used academic
opinion was revealed by James Thomson of Harvard University
in an Atlantic Monthly article in October 1967*

He

described a series of policy-planning sessions in the
State Department in 1962 (he was serving the Department
as an adviser at that time).

Such issues were discussed

as how to deal with bipolar adversaries, how to approach
fractured Communist parties in third world countries,

8°
should we manipulate the Sino-Soviet split or lie low,
and what should he done vis-a-vis mainland China.
Thomson revealed that to many in the Department, this
represented the first realization that there was a split
between Russia and China.

Thomson wanted to use the

split to begin a rapproachement with the People's Republic
of China, but Secretary of State Dean Rusk refused.
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What is interesting is how the bureaucracy in the
Department and the White House decided to deal with the
China problem.

Rusk initiated a study on China to be

undertaken on the outside under foundation grant.

What

resulted v/as an eleven-volume work on "The United States
and China in World Affairs," edited by Robert Blum and
written by top China experts, including A. Doak Barnett,
A. M. Halpern, Lucian Pye, and Alexander Eckstein.

The

volumes produced represented the views of top American
China experts on many facets of Sino-American relations.
The conception and execution of the study show how
scholars were mobilized and funds made available for one
government policy study, and the suggestion is that the
process has been and is repeated.

This example defines

the role of the area expert and his function as a public
relations man for policymakers— not to furnish policy
makers with new ideas— but to hush clamors for liberaliza
tion of policy.

The result in this instance was a weighty

Council on Foreign Relations study that gave the Rusk
containment policy the academic seal of approval.
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Another suggestion of this survey is that led by
the journalists all interpreters of Sino-Soviet affairs
have tended to drift very, very slowly from School #1
tov/ard Schools #4 and #5.

This survey of the perception of the Sino-Soviet
split by three American professional groups, then,
suggests several things.

First, journalists were

undeniably more astute in perceiving the realities of the
split than were academicians and policymakers.
factors could have contributed to this outcome.

Several
Journal

ists tend to be more gregarious by nature than academicians,
thus placing themselves more often in social situations
where world affairs are discussed by those who make them.
The shorter academic preparation required for a journalistic
career compared to the long and tedious preparation
required for the scholar may make the latter more hesitant
to voice opinions that could possibly jeopardize his
position; and, finally, the societal, roles of journalists
and academicians are quite different.

Journalists are

expected to report events as they occur; scholars fit
those events into theories based upon years of study
and reflection.

And policymakers, unlike journalists,

are dependent upon public whim for their positions.
Second, Asia scholars were more conservative in
their perceptions of Sino-Soviet relations than were
Russia scholars, and I attribute this to their separate
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treatment during the McCarthy era, Asia scholars having
been censured and purged while Russia scholars were not.
Third, policymakers failed to perceive the realities
of the Sino-Soviet split (or admit that they did) for
several reasons:

the Cold War slant of public opinion*

the memory of what had happened to government Asia
specialists during the McCarthy era; and the conservative
input of national security managers.
Fourth, policymakers used academic opinion more
than the opinions of journalists in formulating China
policy and in treating Sino-Soviet-American relations
between 19^5 and 1972.
healthy, however.

This use was not altogether

"The United States and China in World

Affairs,” edited by Robert Blum and written by top China
experts, defined the role of the area expert and his
function as a public relations man for policymakers,
not a contributor of new ideas.

I suspect that this

government/university symbiosis is broad and has affected
American foreign and domestic affairs in general and not
just Sino-Soviet-American relations between 19^5 and
1972.
And finally, led by the journalists, all interpreters
of Sino-Soviet affairs have tended to drift
very, very slowly from School #1 toward Schools

and

#5.
In Chapter IV, we will look concisely at the results
of this entire study.
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION

It has been the purpose of this work to demonstrate
through the study of American China policy from 19^5 to
1972 and perception of the Sino-Soviet split from 1956
to 1972 that American foreign policy is no longer a
separate entity from domestic affairs.

It is, rather,

directed by domestic considerations which ultimately
rely upon our perceptions of ourselves and others.

These

perceptions do not simply evolve spontaneously; they
are manipulated, coerced, and distorted by groups and
individuals who hope to attain the triumph of their
ideas, or gain personal power and influence, or perhaps
destroy an enemy.

The reasons why American perceptions

are manipulated are as varied as the manipulators them
selves.

American China policy and American understanding

of Sino-Soviet relations between 19^5 and 1972 were the
outgrowth of domestic affairs and were founded upon
myth, misperception, and missed opportunities.

After World War II, the people of the United States
were afraid of powerful enemies whose ideologies conflicted
with their own.

Nazism and Fascism, were no longer

serious threats to our way of life, but a new ideological
9k

enemy— Communism— had come of age.

We were not so much

afraid of powerful nations as we were of powerful adversary
ideologies, which we perceived as having transcended the
older enemy, nationalism.

The Soviet Union, a temporary

ally of necessity during World War II, was a bastion of
the new enemy ideology and therefore an enemy of the
United States.

Stalin's attempt to create a buffer

zone in Eastern Europe, v/hich he perceived as a bottom
line of defense, was perceived in America as Moscowdirected Communist aggression.

The new enemy, Communism,

loomed larger and larger in our minds.
Our perception and understanding of China had
always suffered distortion, and this distortion grew after
World War II.

We clung to the myth that since the

Revolution of 1911 China had been a developing democracy
and compounded it with the misperception that under
Chiang Kai-shek, the Nationalist leader, it was turning
toward Christianity.

"China market" rhetoric endured,

and we believed China was essential to American well
being because of its vast market for American goods.
This market had never really existed, but we told ourselves
it did so many times that we believed it did.

Because

we also believed Communism was monolithic and Moscowdirected, we could not understand Mao and the Civil
War in China.

Mao could not, in our minds, be the leader

of an indigenous Chinese brand of Communism.

China, after

all, was a developing democracy, and all Commumism was
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directed by the Soviet Union.

Because we misunderstood

so many things, American policymakers missed the opportunity
to court moderate elements in the Chinese Communist
movement before and during the spring of 19^9*

Had we

pragmatically established a relationship with the Chinese
Communists at that time, the history of American foreign
policy for the subsequent quarter-century might have been
different.

We misperceived the nature and strength of

the People's Republic and took its bombastic rhetoric
at face value, basing policy upon the idea, that it was
dangerously expansionist.

Confused at the loss of the

democratic China that had only existed as a figment of
our imaginations, we compounded policymaking mistakes
by formulating China policy upon the myth that the
People's Republic would soon expire, and China would
again be ruled by Chiang Kai-shek.
As our fear of Communism continued to grow, re
development packages for Europe were sold to the American
public in terms of protecting democracies from Communist
aggression.

We were told that this was essential to

American national security, but no explanation was
made of the difference between areas of primary concern
to American interests (Europe) and areas of secondary
concern (Asia) .

This political gamble on the part of

the Truman Administration backfired on the gamblers.
The congressional China bloc, the China Lobby, Senator
Joseph McCarthy, and later the Committee of One Million
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developed and spread a well-defined propaganda lines
China had been essential, to American national security;
it was "lost" as the result of deliberate treachery
*>y various private Asia specialists and State Department
officials; and further damage had to be prevented by
non-recognition of the People's Republic of China and its
exclusion from the United Nations.

Public reaction to

China lobbyist propaganda was hysterical.
these traitors purged— all of them.

We wanted

The careers of

reputable China specialists in the State Department
were destroyed, as were the careers of many in academia,
and journalists were forced to stop writing on China
or leave the United States.

Policymakers could not

risk rapproacheraent with China.

The suggestion of such

a ;thought would mean certain professional ruin.

In

short, we were not basing our foreign policy upon rationality,
but upon fear that began within the continental boundaries
of the United States and was founded upon gross misper
ception and deliberate distortion.
After the hysteria of the McCarthy era died down,
misperception remained to affect American foreign policy.
Since the myth of monolithic Communism was so ingrained
in our minds, and since informed dissent was professional
ly dangerous, rigid adherence to orthodoxy dominated
formulation of China policy as well as policymakers'
and academicians' perceptions of the Sino-Soviet split.
Journalists, whose societal roles gave them more independence
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and flexibility than academicians and policymakers
enjoyed, became aware of the reality of Sino-Soviet
relations, but policymakers did not listen to them.
The policymaking process had changed greatly since
World War II.

The State Department had declined in

importance, and national security advisors, whose power
and positions were dependent upon the elected officials
they advised, had come to wield authority and influence.
The tendency was for them to over-simplify, fitting
facts into established theories.
university symbiosis developed.

Concurrently, a government/
The government ordered

and paid for policy studies; academicians gave them what
they wanted to hear.

After all, funds could be attracted

that way, and dissent, as the McCarthyite purges proved,
could be very dangerous.

Thus, the propaganda line

espoused by the China bloc, the China Lobby, Joseph
McCarthy, and later the Committee of One Million,
triumphed in a society predisposed to its reception by
unrealistic fear of an ideology different from its own.
This line, which was founded upon myth and gross misper
ception, molded American thinking into a rigid orthodoxy
that simply could not allow for a Sino-American rapproachment or the acknowledgement of a fissure in the Communist
monolith,

in spite of overwhelming evidence that the

monolith did not in fact exist.'

Consequently, many

American academicians were blinded by ideological rigidity
and fear, failing to perceive the Sino-Soviet split.
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China scholars, who were censured so severely during the
McCarthy era, were driven to conservatism.

Policymakers,

bound by orthodoxy and reinforced by national security
managers with tunnel vision, used scholars as "yes men"
for their positions by handing out handsome grants for
policy studies.

Finally journalists, from their com

paratively independent positions, began to voice the
truth, and America began, slowly, to listen.

In 1972,

an American President visited the People's Republic of
China, and the correction of a long lasting, serious
error began.
It has been the thesis of this.work that American
China policy and American understanding of Sino-Soviet
relations between 19^5 and 1972 were the outgrowth of
domestic affairs and were founded upon gross misperception.
This misperception began within ourselves and was fed,
reinforced, and perpetuated at level after level of the
policymaking process.

It is hoped that similar mistakes

can be prevented; but prevention cannot come without
change, and change is never instigated until a need for
it is realized.

There is indeed a need for change;

this study illustrates the workings of a mistake.
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reasons for the lag in perception "by policymakers as well
as by academicians and for the comparative insight of
journalists.
Another inference I draw from this survey is that
policymakers used academic opinion more than the opinions
of journalists in formulating China policy and in treating
Sino-Soviet relations between 19^5 and 1972.

I do not

mean, however, that academicians had an effective input
in the foreign policymaking process, or that the press
was not manipulated by those in power; but there was a
basic difference between the government-university rela
tionship and the government-journalistic relationship—
a difference that still exists.

The latter relationship

reveals relatively more independence.

After World War

II, area studies departments were begun in universities all
over the country.

In case after case, they were financed

through government grants.

Academicians either followed

the line of orthodoxy in order to attract funds, or they
retreated into the private "think tanks."
A case in point of how the government used academic
opinion was revealed by James Thomson of Harvard University
in an Atlantic Monthly article in October 1967*

He

described a series of policy-planning sessions in the
State Department in 1962 (he was serving the Department
as an adviser at that time).

Such issues were discussed

as how to deal with bipolar adversaries, how to approach
fractured Communist parties in third world countries,

